ABSTRACT Collaborative filtering is now successfully applied to recommender systems. The availability of extensive personal data is necessary for generating high quality recommendations. However, traditional collaborative filtering methods suffer from sparse and sometimes cold-start problems, particularly for newly deployed recommenders. Currently, several recommender systems exist in good working order, and data collected from these existing systems should be valuable for newly deployed recommenders. This paper introduces a privacy preserving shared collaborative filtering problem in order to leverage the data from other parties (contributors) to improve its own (beneficiaries) collaborative filtering performance, with the privacy protected under a differential privacy framework. It proposes a two-step methodology to solve this problem. First, item-based neighborhood information is selected as the shared data from the contributor with guaranteed differential privacy, and a practical enforcement mechanism for differential privacy is proposed. Second, two novel algorithms are developed to enable the beneficiary to leverage the shared data to support improved collaborative filtering. The extensive experimental results show that the proposed methodology can increase the recommendation accuracy of the beneficiary significantly while preserving data privacy for the contributors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recomender systems have been widely used in real world applications, such as the commodity recommender Amazon.com [10] , the movie recommenders MovieLens [32] and Netflix [33] , [34] , and the music recommender Last.fm [31] . As the core recommendation technology, collaborative filtering (CF) [6] , [10] predicts the interestingness of items to a particular user based on the known interestingness of items to other users, in other words, using community data. The underlying assumptions of a CF approach is that personal tastes are correlative and that users who have exhibited similar interests will tend to share future interests. In contrast to content-based methods, CF does not need to acknowledge the content information of items or explicitly defined user preferences, thus making it significantly more flexible and easier to implement, compared with the dominant approach to implementing real world recommendation systems. Nevertheless, because CF performance depends considerably on the availability of extensive community data, the application of CF suffers from data sparsity and cold-start problems [42] , particularly in newly deployed recommenders.
Several recommender systems have been implemented when large amounts of community data are available. The resulting datasets offer considerable potential for solving the application problems of CF in newly started recommender systems [14] , [35] . This study exploits this potential to investigate ways of employing the datasets from existing systems for achieving enhanced CF in new systems. Because community data might be accessed and utilized for malicious purposes [3] , [15] , [16] , [20] , [46] , a key issue concerns the Privacy Preserving CF (PPCF), i.e., how to safely apply CF across multiple datasets while preventing privacy leakages [11] , [13] , [21] , [22] , [25] , [26] , [45] , [49] .
Two main privacy technologies can be applied to the dataset-level PPCF, i.e., sanitization and Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocols. The former emphasizes data anonymization [8] , [18] prior to data publishing to prevent the re-identification of individual records. However, sanitization is vulnerable to adversaries' background knowledge [13] and might cause irreparable damage for data mining [9] . The latter [19] affords strong privacy enforcement, but incurs the prohibitive costs of computation and communication. Differential Privacy (DP) [5] is a recently proposed privacy model that can guarantee strong privacy independent of an adversary's available auxiliary information. It has been used to develop private recommender systems within a single party scenario [9] , [44] .
This study employs the DP framework to address PP shared CF, also known as shared CF. The proposed two-party scheme focuses on how the data recipient (i.e., beneficiary B) utilizes the data stored in the data collector (i.e., contributor A) to improve its recommendation while preserving the privacy of the data collector.
A simple intuition informing our research is that, if an item set (or a user set) of a contributor overlaps with that of the beneficiary, the data from the contributor might be valuable for shared CF. Because of privacy concerns, it is impractical to ascertain whether the user sets of two parties overlap. However, it is common for different parties to have similar item sets, e.g., the movie items in different movie sites often overlap. Thus, we examine the case in which the item sets of different parties overlap. In this two-party scenario, the item overlapping can be seen as a kind of vertical partitioning. Without losing generality, we assume that the item sets of different parties are identical because for overlapping cases, we could only leverage the overlapped portion of the items.
Based on the above considerations, this study integrates privacy protection into the process of shared data generation (in the sphere of a data collector) and consumption (in the sphere of a data recipient) for enhanced information utilization. We propose a two-step approach to shared CF. First, the contributor party shares the neighborhood information about the items. The DP framework is adopted to guarantee privacy protection by specifying practical solutions to computing the smooth sensitivities of Pearson Correlation based item similarity and the data density. Then, we propose two item-based neighborhood boosting algorithms that can be adopted by the beneficiary to leverage such shared data from a contributor for generating quality recommendations.
Here we give three possible business application scenarios. (1) The mature recommender systems with rich data, such as Amazon.com, could provide data service to publish or sell their data to the public in a privavy preserved way, and other systems could utilize such data to improve their own performance. (2) When a site joins in a commercial league, the league organizer can afford the data of other league members to this new site for speeding up its recommender system. Since each league member is autonomous, its data privacy should be preserved. In a real business world, there are many cases in which two e-commerce sites are both competitors and business partners. The potential motivations for the contributor to share its data to the beneficiary derive from their codependency relationships. For example, the contributor might sell the customized data to the beneficiary by providing data as a service. Or the contributor and beneficiary explore a mutually interesting market together, where they share the same product/service set but with different competition strategies, e.g., one adopts low pricing while the other does prompt delivery. (3) A contributor's business can largely benefit from its corresponding beneficiary's business's healthy growth.
From a privacy protection angle, our study resembles the studies of [9] , [44] , [47] , and [48] . However, the solutions of these previous studies are inapplicable to the shared CF problem because (1) the query functions (to which the random noise is applied) are different, which renders the mathematics in [9] , [44] , [47] , and [48] for noise computing inapplicable to the functions of the Pearson Correlation (PC) based similarity score between items and the density of the shared data from the contributor; and (2) the shared CF solution must consider how the beneficiary consumes the shared data from the contributor along with its own data for improving its recommendation, a step that is not required (and thus not addressed) in [9] , [44] , [47] , and [48] .
The contributions of this study can be summarized as follows: 1) for the first time, it presents the concept and solution of the shared CF problem, which addresses how the data recipient can employ shared data from other contributor parties for improving its CF while preserving the privacy of the contributing parties; 2) the local sensitivity framework is used as a practical mechanism for enforcing DP for shared CF, where the practical solutions to computing the smooth sensitivities of Pearson Correlation based item similarity and the data density are given; and 3) an empirical evaluation of shared CF is provided. On the condition that the individual privacy of the contributor is protected, when the beneficiary's data are sparse, the CF can be improved significantly, demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed approach. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 defines the privacy model and the problem to be solved. Section 4 describes the proposed shared CF approach. Experiments and evaluation results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This study can be classified as PPCF, the main task of which is to make the CF performance as good as or close 36 VOLUME 5, 2017 to the performance when the data are centralized while preserving the privacy of both parties. Existing literature addresses individual-level and dataset-level PPCF. The former assumes that the data owner does not trust the data collector, and its focus is the privacy issue between the record owner and the data collector [2] , [4] , [13] , [23] , [37] . By contrast, we assume the data collector is trustworthy. However, our study borrows the assertion in [23] that item-based neighborhoods are exploited for shared CF.
This study is closely related to the dataset-level PPCF approach, which assumes that the data collector is trustworthy. This approach mainly addresses the privacy issues between the data collector and the recipient. We know that a typical CF solution requires a large amount of pre-existing community data. In many cases, however, the available data are insufficient for CF to produce accurate predictions. An intuitive way to solve this data sparsity problem is to merge the data from multiple parties to improve CF. To address the privacy issues introduced by this multi-party setting, several studies on dataset-level PPCF are reported [1] , [4] , [12] , [19] . Based on the fact that the dataset to be merged for CF might be horizontally or vertically partitioned among the involved parties, the proposed solutions can be segmented into two types, i.e., PPCF over horizontally and vertically partitioned data.
The existing dataset-level PPCF study aims to maximize the mutual profits of the involved parties while preserving their data privacy. Hence, all proposed solutions consider the data distributed across different parties as an entirety and apply the multi-party computing scenarios that require mutual communication among different parties, so communication is bidirectional. However, this study aims to improve the CF accuracy of a beneficiary while preserving the privacy of contributors. The application scenario features one beneficiary, but multiple contributors. Thus, only one-way communication exists, namely from contributor to beneficiary. DP [5] , [43] has recently emerged as a modern privacy measure to guarantee that no record in the data can affect the computing outcome. It has been adopted in [9] , [42] , [44] and [47] for dataset-level and individual-level PPCF, respectively. In the CF setting, the private record information might refer to the user existence in a user-item matrix, the rated/unrated item set or the true item ratings of a given user. By assuming that attackers are algorithm designers who build recommendation systems, the traditional DP framework [5] is used for its privacy enforcement in [9] , i.e., to compute the global sensitivity to obtain the theoretical bound of the added noise. This study adopts the same attacker assumption as does [9] . However, to calculate the bounds of added noises, we employ the local sensitivity framework [43] , which holds considerable potential for reducing the noise added to the query results. Additionally, the query function in our shared CF case corresponds to the item similarity scores and the dataset density and thus differs from the global effects and covariance matrix in [9] . The study in [42] , [44] , and [47] assumes that attackers are general users who only interact with recommendation systems. Our study differs from the technical solutions in [42] and [47] because the latter use the global sensitivity framework [5] to enforce the DP. Similar to this study, the study in [44] adopts the local sensitivity framework [43] to preserve neighborhood privacy. However, that study's query functions consider only the Cosine based item similarity and thus differ from our query functions, which consider not only the PC based similarities among items but also the data density. Notably, the proposed method in [44] for computing the smooth sensitivity of Cosine based similarity is flawed. This method does not consider how the local sensitivity changes when up to k entries in the input dataset are modified. Moreover, the conclusion in [44, Lemma 2] fails to satisfy the requirement of the smooth bound defined in [43] . The shared CF solution must solve the problem of how to combine the data from two parties for improved CF, thus significantly distinguishing the study in this paper from the studies reported in [9] , [44] , [47] , and [48] .
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Several practical attacks are demonstrated in [13] to allow the accurate inference of individual behavior from the outputs of a typical recommender by combining a moderate amount of auxiliary information. There are two types of attack models. The first one is a passive inference attack model requiring only passive access to the public outputs of the system that are available to all users. An attacker cannot create fake customers or enter purchases or ratings into the system. Second is an active attack model in which an attacker creates fake users and manipulates their entries (i.e., adding new entries, modifying and deleting existing entries) in the rows of a transaction matrix.
These real-world attacks are only from general users of a recommender. Unfortunately, for the shared CF problem, potential attackers are not general users but can be algorithm designers who build recommendation systems. They would be more powerful on auxiliary information collection and algorithm development. Assuming that an old version database MB is available to an attacker, which contains a user-item matrix. The attacker cannot access the updated database MB, from where the shared data is generated. There are x new registered users in MB. The attacker has obtained x − 1 users' identities and ratings and the rating details of user p 1 . Assume that the attacker also knows that there are two persons, i.e., p 1 and p 2 , are candidates of the x-th user. Then the attacker may make such an inference: If the top-k neighborhood list is l, p 1 is in the database; and otherwise, p 2 is in the database. If ensuring that p 2 is in the database, the attacker can infer the possible rating details of p 2 or link this fact with other auxiliary information to make additional inference, for example, the tastes or behaviors of p 2 on the Web. Hence, we need to deal with the attackers who might be a system builder and follow an active inference attack model.
The study [5] shows that the privacy guarantees provided by DP are very strong and independent of an adversary's background knowledge or computational power.
Thus, a randomized computing K satisfying the definition can guarantee the privacy of a record in the dataset against attackers even if they know every other record of the dataset and have unrestricted auxiliary information about their targets.
Within the scope of the shared CF problem are two types of participant parties: the beneficiary party, called A, and the contributor party, called B. Each party has a user set and an item set. The parties' user sets are annotated by U A = {u A1 , u A2 , . . . , u Ama } and U B = {u B1 , u B2 , . . . , u Bmb }, respectively. As mentioned, we only consider the case that A and B share the same item set, annotated by I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n }. Within each party, for a specific user u and a specific item i, u might like or dislike i, and u's opinion is typically represented by a rating score r A ui or r B ui . Note that in this study, we assume that numeric ratings are used to represent how much a user likes an item. If user u has not rated item i, then we denote r A ui = r B ui = φ. All the rating scores form a user-item rating matrix, with each row representing a user and each column representing an item. Their rating matrices are annotated by M A and M B , with dimensions measuring m a × n and m b × n, respectively.
The traditional CF task is to predict the missing rating scores based on existing scores within a single party. The task of a shared CF is defined as: predicting the missing rating score of M A with the existing scores of both M A and M B , while preserving the data privacy of B by using the DP framework. More specifically, an adversary that attempts to attack the privacy of an individual user will not be able to infer from the shared data of B whether a record representing the user is present or absent in M B . In addition to designing a PP algorithm, the goal is to ensure the prediction accuracy of shared CF exceeds that of using M A only. Table 1 summarizes the notations used in this paper. 
IV. PRILIMINARIES
Existing CF techniques can be classified into memory and learning-based approaches. The former mainly utilizes user ratings to compute similarities between users or items, which are then used to make recommendations. Two popular item similarity analysis approaches for memory-based CF are the Pearson Correlation (PC) and Latent Semantic Model (LSM). Let C i ={u|u ∈ U ,r ui = φ} denote the set of users who have rated item i. For item pair (i, j), the PC is defined as:
wherer i represents the average rating score of i by users of C i ; and C ij represents the set of users who have rated both item i and j, i.e., C ij = C i ∩ C j . Thus, the similarity between items i and j can be calculated as
LSM first transfers both users and items into a more compact latent semantic space [19] and then leverages latent semantic analysis to calculate the similarity within such space. To compute LSM based similarity, we need preprocessing steps to compute the missing score [24] . Then, the SVD is conducted to reconstruct the rating matrix M (with rank r)
, where only t (t < r) largest singular values are retained. Then, each column vector v * i in M * is the feature vector of item i in the latent semantic space, and item similarity is calculated as the normalized dot product of item feature vectors:
A typical memory-based CF algorithm used within a single party A is: if k-nearest neighborhoods of an item i are acquired A i = {a i1 , a i2 , . . . , a ik } ⊆ I − {i}, then the predicted rating of user u ∈ U A for item i is:
Note that A i in (4.3) can be determined using the item similarity methods via (4.1) or (4.2) in the context of M A .
The learning-based CF approach adopts machine learning algorithms to construct the underlying model of user preferences. Then, the recommendation is made by the model inference. A typical singular value decomposition (SVD)-based latent factor model [39] to infer the prediction can be expressed as r A ui = µ + b u + b i + p T u q i , where µ denotes the overall average rating, e.g., the average rating over all the movies is 3 stars; b i (b u ) is the item (user) bias and indicates the observed variation in rating values because of the effect of an associated individual item i (user u), e.g., Titanic is a movie that tends to be rated 0.5 points better than an average movie (a critical user tends to rate a movie 0.4 stars lower than the average); q i (p u ) represents the vector associated with item i (user u), where each element is a real value and denotes the extent to which item i (user u) is associated with the corresponding latent factor. By considering all latent factors, p T u q i measures the overall interest of user u in item i. This study investigates a shared CF problem using the DP framework. It requires that the outcome of a randomized computation be insensitive to the removal or addition of any record. The following definition is owing to [5] .
Definition 1: A randomized computation K provides ε-DP if for any two adjacent datasets D i and D j differing on at most one record, and any set of possible outcomes
This definition bounds the ability of inference from any event S regarding the presence or absence of any single record. ε is a predefined privacy parameter to control the privacy level. The larger ε, the weaker privacy protection.
Assuming that the dataset is D and the true output of function f on D is f (D), a standard approach to achieve DP is to introduce appropriately chosen random noise Noise into f (D), i.e., f (D) = f (D) + Noise where the potential influence of the presence or absence of a single record on the output function f is masked. According to [5] , the required noise is proportional to the global sensitivity of a function, as defined next.
Definition 2: The global sensitivity GS f of a function f is its maximum difference when evaluated on two neighboring databases:
The function f with lower GS f is more tolerant to changes in a dataset and therefore allows more accurate differentially private mechanisms. For f whose outputs are real, the DP guarantee can be achieved by adding random noise conforming to a Laplace distribution [5] , where an essential operation for enforcing DP is the computing of GS f , i.e., the noise magnitude is only determined byf and independent of dataset D. Considering that many query functions are typically insensitive to an individual dataset D, local sensitivity is introduced in [43] .
Definition 3: Given dataset D, the local sensitivity LS of function f is its maximum difference when evaluated on two neighboring datasets:
LS f (D) offers considerable potential for its release with less noise. However, as shown in [43] , directly releasing query results with a noise magnitude proportional to LS f (D), as the noise magnitude might reveal information about dataset D. An upper bound is required to smooth the noise magnitude. The smallest function to bound LS f (D) is called the smooth sensitivity of f [43] .
Definition 4: For β > 0, the β-smooth sensitivity of f is
In our shared CF, the data sharing from B to A is a onetime action, i.e., the dataset in B is already fixed when being processed for sharing. Then, the number of users in D is limited. We concern per-user privacy, i.e., the likelihood an adversary can make an accurate inference from the output ordered lists and data density regarding whether a specific user exists in B. Because both PC based similarity score c(i, j) and data density ρ B are single real values, the following theorem from [43] can be adopted to enforce the DP.
Theorem 1: For a function f (D) that returns a single real value, the (ε, δ)-differential privacy, with ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), can be achieved with the mechanism
, where β ≤ ε/2ln(2/δ). This theorem shows that determining the smooth sensitivity of function f (D) is essential for enforcing local sensitivity based DP.
V. ITEM-NEIGHBORHOOD BASED SHARED CF
To make shared CF practical, as shown in Figure 1 , we design a two-step approach to decouple the compact binding of two involved parties: (1) B generates shared data from its own M B , and privacy is protected using the DP framework; and (2) A leverages the shared data from B and M A to generate predictions. 
A. SHARED DATA GENERATION WITH B
This section describes the shared data generation with B within the DP framework.
1) NON-PRIVATE SHARED DATA GENERATION
During the CF process, input, intermediate or output information is of three types: user-only information, i.e., input user set, with user similarity generated by memory-based CF; item-only information, i.e., input item set, with item similarity generated by memory-based CF; and user-item relation information, i.e., input and output rating scores, with a relation model generated by model-based CF. Because user information is sensitive to B, publishing B's user-only or user-item relation information is risky. By contrast, itemonly information seems safe. Memory-based CF can leverage item similarity for recommendations. Then, if B shares the item similarity relevant information, which is calculated with B's data, it may also be useful for A's CF. Therefore, from either B's perspective of privacy or A's perspective of data VOLUME 5, 2017 utility, it should be a sound decision to publish item similarity information from B.
In the proposed solution, B publishes each item's neighborhood list as its shared data. For each item pair i, j ∈ I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n }, based on the similarity analysis with the existing M B , the similarity between i and j is denoted s B (i, j), with a larger s B (i, j) value indicating i and j are more similar. The k nearest neighborhood items of i in the context of M B is denoted
B publishes a set of B i for each i in I , and the shared item neighborhood dataset is denoted B={B 1 ,B 2 ,. . . ,B n }. Here, we adopt PC to calculate B={B 1 ,B 2 ,. . . ,B n } within B.
Because the item sets of A and B are identical in this study, the PC of a given item pair can be determined based on either A's data or B's data. To differentiate among PCs, we designate the results as c A (i,j) and c B (i,j), respectively. Then, the item neighborhoods shared by B are generated based on c B (i,j) for each pair of items.
It is known that the data density of B impacts the performance of B's item similarity analysis [10] . To afford A greater flexibility in leveraging the shared data from B, B publishes not only the shared neighborhood dataset B but also its data density ρ B , which corresponds to the fraction of existing rating scores in M B :
Using (4.1) to calculate the item similarity and (4.4) to compute the data density, B can publish each item's neighborhood list and ρ B as its non-private shared data. To address the privacy concerns of B, data sanitization is required.
2) SHARED DATA SANITIZATION
In order to enforce local sensitivity based DP, we need to compute the smooth sensitivity of function f (D).
(2.1) The smooth sensitivity of PC based similarity According to [43] , the sensitivity of f 1 at distance k is defined as LS
, which measures how much the sensitivity can change when up to k entries of D are modified. Then, the smooth sensitivity can be expressed in terms of LS
This formula shows that, to compute the smooth sensitivity, for each k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we must find 
given by useru to item pair (i, j). The data points in D ij can be divided into three groups, i.e., G 1 = {(r ui , r uj )|r ui = φ, r uj = φ}, G 2 = {(r ui , r uj )|r ui = φ, r uj = φ}, and
Assuming r possible values are allowed for a user to rate the item, G 1 contains at most r 2 distinct data points (r ui , r uj ) for each item pair (i, j). For example, in the Netflix dataset, the rating values range from 1 to 5. As shown in Figure 2 , G 1 contains at most 25 distinct data points {(x, y)|1 ≤ x ≤ 5, 1 ≤ y ≤ 5}. For G 2 (G 3 ), there are r distinct data points {(φ, r uj )|r uj = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} ({(r ui , φ)|r ui = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). All rating pairs (and the corresponding users assigning the ratings) are distributed among the 25 + 5 + 5 = 35 distinct data points. Clearly, at most 4r-4=16 distinct boundary points are in G 1 . For G 2 and G 3 , the two distinct boundary points are {(φ, min{r uj = φ}), (φ, max{r uj = φ})} and {(min{r uj = φ}, φ), (max{r uj = φ}, φ)}, respectively. Let Previous research [27] , [28] indicates that for the given f 1 in (4.1), u * D must be the user whose rating (r ui , r uj ) for item pair (i, j) is distant from the other data or located at the boundary of the given dataset. The most influential user u * D must be a user u ∈ (D). If we can calculate
For each distinct data point t = (r ui , r uj ), there is a set U t of users giving the same rating pair. All users in U t share the same value of ||f (D\{v ∈ U t }) − f (D\({v ∈ U t } ∪ {u}))||. For the Netflix dataset, we can rank U t (1 ≤ t ≤ 35) according to its ||f (D\{v ∈ U t }) − f (D\({v ∈ U t } ∪ {u}))|| and obtain a ranklist
An intuitive way of computing LS u f 1 D * involves ranking each data point v ∈ D using its impact value ||f (D\{v}) − f (D\({v} ∪ {u}))|| and then selecting the top k data points as U * uk to determine LS u f 1 D * . Because the impact directions of distinct data points from distinct U t (1 ≤ t ≤ 35) might differ [28] , [29] , the resulting ||f (D\U
However, when all k data points derive from the same U s , they have identical impact directions. Given a U s with |U s | ≥ k, let U 1k be a set of k data points from U s , i.e., U 1k ⊂ U s , and U 2k a set ofk users from {U s+1 ∪ U s+2 ∪ . . . ∪ U 35 }. Then, we can have ||f 1 (D\U 1k 
Based on the above considerations, let δ * uk and δ * k denote LS u f 1 D * and LS f 1 D * , respectively. Then, the approximate algorithm to compute LS f 1 D * for item pair (i, j) as follows.
In Line 8, a brute force method to determine U * uk and then δ * uk is used to enumerate all combinations of k data points in D s . Because thek users (data points) of U * uk derive from
, in the implementation of Line 8, we added a constraint to reduce the search cost.
We re-sort the sU i (1 ≤ i ≤ s) by their cardinalities from small to large and obtain the sequence U r1 ≤ U r2 ≤ . . . ≤ U rs , where each U rj denotes the user set U i (1 ≤ i ≤ s) whose |U i | is ranked at j of the s numbers of |U i |. U r1 (U rs ) is the user set with minimum (maximum) cardinality. From U r1 ≤ U r2 ≤ . . . ≤ U rs , we can determine the minimum y with |U r1 | + |U r2 | + . . . + |U ry | ≥ k and the maximum z with
||, all the contained users in x − 1 of them are in U * uk . That is, there is only one U i (1 ≤ i ≤ s) for which a subset of its contained users are included in U * uk . Therefore, x must satisfy the condition y ≥ x ≥ s − z. This constraint can improve the efficiency of Algorithm 1 significantly.
LS f 1 (D ) for Item Pair (i, j)
Input: the parameter k; the similarity function f 1 in (4.1); dataset D Output: 
End
The computing complexity of each u ∈ (D) is bounded by O(C x s ). Since the worst-case computing cost might be intolerable, in Line 7, we set a threshold value to bound the computing complexity at the cost of computing accuracy. ≤ s) , there are at most k ways of user selection. Because the minimum and maximum values of f 1 (D) are −1 and 1, respectively, the maximum ||f 1 (D\U 1k ) − f 1 (D\(U 1k ∪ {u}))|| is 2. When the computing cost is higher than the threshold value , we directly set the δ * uk to the maximum value 2. The Algorithm 2 is the pseudo code for computing the smooth sensitivity of PC based similarity.
Because only users who rated item i or j will affect item similarity, a subset C ij of dataset D is defined in Line 5 for computing f 1 . Given the data sparsity, such filtering can reduce the computing significantly.
The smooth sensitivity for some item pairs may be very large when an active user has rated many items, thus possibly reducing the positive impact of the shared data on CF performance. To anticipate this possibility, a cleaning step [9] can be adopted to remove a substantial amount of noise and subsequently to offset performance degradation.
(2.2) Smooth sensitivity of the data density The sensitivity of f 2 at distance k is LS If i = j 5.
C ij = {u|u ∈ U , r ui = φ||r uj = φ}; 6.
For k = 1: 1 can only be derived in one of the following two cases, i.e., 1) when |{(u * , i)|i ∈ I , r B ui = φ| is the maximum value, and |{(u, i)|u ∈ U B {u * }, i ∈ I , r B ui = φ| is the minimum value; or 2) when |{(u * , i)|i ∈ I , r B ui = φ| is the minimum value, and |{(u, i)|u ∈ U B {u * }, i ∈ I , r B ui = φ| is the maximum value.
Let |I u | denote the number of items rated by user u. Then, we can rank the users in U B by |I u | to obtain a ranklist L ={u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u |UB| } with |I ui | ≥ |I ui+1 |, 1 ≤ i ≤ |U B |−1, where u 1 is the most active user in U B , who rates the maximum number of items, i.e., |I u * | = max u |I u |, u ∈ U B ; and u |UB| is the most inactive user, i.e.,
The following observations can be used to compute max
LS f 2 (D ):
• When j = 1, case 1) implies u * = u 1 , and U B = U B ; and case 2) implies u * = u |UB| , and U B = U B .
• When j > 1, case 1) implies u * = u 1 , and U B = U B \{the top j − 1 users in list L 1 = L − u 1 }; and case 2)
The result of max d(D,D )=j

LS f 2 (D ) indicates that when
, we must only consider max
LS f 2 (D).
After LS
is obtained, the smooth sensitivity of the data density f 2 can be derived directly [43] .
B. SHARED DATA UTILIZATION OF A
After acquiring the shared data from B, A uses them to improve CF. Although existing memory and learning-based CF techniques have been successfully applied to real recommendation systems, the fact that only the data from a single party are considered makes their direct use in shared CF impossible. Using these two classes of CF approaches, this study first introduces an intuitive memory-based algorithm for shared CF. Then, a learning-based approach that employs the multifaceted model for shared CF is proposed, where the relations among items and interactions between users and items are combined for CF.
1) INTUITIVE APPROACH
To use the shared data from B, we merge the derived neighborhood information from two parties. A neighborhood boosting algorithm is designed to combine A i and B i for each item i and obtain a boosted neighbor set, denotated H i , to be used in formula (4.3) instead of A i . The boosting algorithm proceeds according to the following logic.
The user sets of A and B are not identical and thus may exhibit different user patterns. Because B i is generated with B's rating data, it reflects the user pattern of B only. Arbitrary usage of B i in A's CF may incur significant noise and decrease performance, contrary to the intention of shared CF. Moreover, item similarity analysis of either A or B may be biased due to lack of sufficient data, data noise, or the inherent limitation of similarity measures. In other words, the item similarity is computed based on its own partitioned data only, either A i or B i is biased even in the context of its own party. However, if A i and B i share an intersection N i = A i ∩ B i = φ, then the neighborhood information existing in this intersection set should be more convincing in the context of both parties compared with other information.
Thus, the neighborhoods in N i should receive the highest priority for utilization. It is assumed that the number of the neighborhoods in resultant H i is designated as k, the same as the number of neighborhoods in A i and B i . Then, in addition to N i , another (k −|N i |) neighborhoods must be selected from N i ) . Because B has published its data density ρ B , and A can compute its ρ A , we have: 
Because this algorithm combines two relatively weak neighborhood sets A i and B i into a stronger set H i for A, we name it neighborhood boosting. After the boosted neighborhood set is derived, the predicted rating of user u ∈ U A for item i is calculated as follows (only the similarity score derived in the context of A is used):
2) LEARNING-BASED APPROACH Two successful learning-based CF approaches are neighborhood and latent factor models. In [40] , the factor and neighborhood models are merged to yield more accurate CF. However, the combined model is not applicable here because it considers only the data from a single party. Motivated by the work [40] , we propose the combined model for shared CF, which enables A to utilize the shared data from B, i.e., B={B 1 ,B 2 ,. . . ,B n }, and its own data for improved CF. We extend the basic SVD model to consider the item neighborhood information and propose a multifaceted model to solve the shared CF problem. The following equation is formulated to improve prediction accuracy:
w B ij (w A ij ) represents the relative weight of item j to item i in the context of B i (A i ) derived from contributor party B (beneficiary party A), which is independent of a specific user. r A u is the average rating score of user u in A.
In (4.7), by encapsulating the first three components µ, b u , and b i together, b ui = µ+b u +b i provides a baseline estimate of the rating [39] . It is determined by considering the effects of users and items independently. The fourth component p T u q i reflects the portion produced by capturing the signal representing the interactions between users and items [40] . The final two components, i.e., j B i
, denote the portion derived from the item-based neighborhood information. Different from the existing CF [39] that considers only one dataset, the proposed CF considers the item-based relationships discovered from not only the data in A but also the shared data of B. Because the focus of our approach is how to employ the shared data from a contributor party to improve the CF performance of a beneficiary party, in (4.7), the implicit feedback N (u) defined in [40] is not considered. Additionally, because the userindependent weights w B ij (w A ij ) are obtained from the data, in this model, incorporating the data density information ρ B is not required.
To estimate the model parameters b u , b i , p u , q i , w B ij , and w A ij , we can solve the regularized least square problem associated with (4.7):
where λ 1 − λ 6 are the regularization strength coefficients. The gradient descent method [40] can be applied here to determine the parameters.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATIONS A. DATASET PREPARATION
We use two datasets, MovieLens and Netflix, to simulate a shared CF process with two parties, which have the same item set, but distinct user sets. MovieLens is a CF-based movie recommender developed by the University of Minnesota. It has released three versions of their data [30] . We select the version with 10 million ratings for 10,681 movies by 71,567 users. Netflix is a commercial movie rental website. It supplied a dataset originally for Netflix Prize [34], which contains 100,480,507 ratings for 17,770 movies by 480,189 users. The ratings in two datasets are both graded from 1 to 5. In our case, MovieLens (Netflix) acts as A(B), i.e., A uses the shared data from B to improve its CF.
To allow the two parties to have the same items, the movie items of these two datasets are aligned, and 4,064 identical items are found. To accelerate the experiments, the datasets are reduced in three ways: for movie items, 1,000 items are randomly sampled from the 4,064 identical movie items; within each party, 10,000 users are randomly sampled; correspondingly, only the rating scores related to the sampled items VOLUME 5, 2017 and users are filtered in both parties. Finally, the sampled dataset of MovieLens, denoted X , contains 183,934 ratings for 1,000 movies by 10,000 users, and the sampled dataset of Netflix, denoted by Y , contains 305,401 ratings for 1,000 movies by 10,000 users. These two reduced datasets have the same movie set, but distinct user sets.
To evaluate the rating prediction accuracy of A, a set of test data is selected from X . We randomly divide the 183,934 ratings of X into 5 subsets of equal size, i.e., X 1 −X 5 . Each subset contains 36,786 ratings for 1,000 movies by 10,000 users. Four subsets with 147,144 total ratings are selected as training data, and another subset with 36,786 ratings is selected for testing. Using permutation, 5 combinations are constructed for cross-validation:
are used as training data, and X 5 (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) are used as test data.
To investigate the performance variation with the data density, we also generated several groups of datasets with different densities from X . We randomly divide X 1 #1 into 5 subsets of equal size, i.e., X 1 1 − X 1 5 , each of which contains 29,428 ratings for 1,000 movies by 10,000 users. Similarly, 4 subsets with 117,712 total ratings are selected as training data, with another subset containing 29,428 ratings used for testing. Using permutation, 5 combinations of training data (denoted X 1 #2 − X 5 #2 ) and test data are generated for cross-validation. Repeating the dividing process, we generate 16 groups of datasets, denoted Group #1-#15. Each group #i (i = 1-15) comprises 5 combinations of training data (denoted X 1 #i − X 5 #i ) and test data for cross-validation. We also generate 5 different datasets for B from Y for multiple tests. We randomly divide the 305,401 ratings of Y into 5 subsets of equal size, i.e., Y 1 − Y 5 , each of which includes 61,080 ratings for 1,000 movies by 10,000 users.
Then, 5 datasets are constructed as
Each dataset contains 122,160 ratings with a data density of 1.22%. The experiments are conducted using 15 groups × 5 sets of A's data and 5 sets of B's data. Table 2 shows the information of these generated datasets.
B. METRICS AND METHODS
We adopt the statistical metric Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for evaluating the accuracy of rating predictions [1] .
Four variants of the shared CF approach are implemented:
• P(A)+P ε (B): Intuitive CF with PC similarity for both A and B;
• L(A)+P ε (B): Intuitive CF with LSM (PC) similarity for A (B);
• P(A)+P ε (B)-learning, L(A)+P ε (B)-learning, are learning-based versions of the first two methods, respectively. Because the computing cost is tolerable for our experiments, we set the threshold to = ∞. The (ε, δ)-differential privacy is a relaxed form of ε-differential privacy, where δ designates a bound of the probability that the mechanismM (D) provides significantly more information than for ε-differential privacy. A variety of (ε, δ) pairs can be used to establish differential privacy with a trade-off between parameters ε and δ. For simplicity, we set δ = 0.01 and vary the value of ε from 0.001-1000.
Similar to [19] , for the LSM similarity, the dimension reduction parameter t is set to 2. For learning-based approaches, we set the iteration bound for stochastic gradient descent to 50 and conduct the model selection experiments on the #1 dataset group. Based on the best tuned results, the dimension number of latent factors is set to 100, the learning rate α is set to 0.1, and all the regularization coefficients, i.e., λ 1 − λ 6 , are set to 0.05. For simplicity, these parameters are used for all the other dataset groups.
As described above, we have 15 groups of A's datasets with different data densities. Each group includes 5 sets for crossvalidation. Another 5 sets are based on B's data. Thus, as final results, an average MAE value is calculated for each method and each group of Party A's datasets.
C. SELECTING k
The selection of the parameter k for the k-nearest neighborhood is important for completing an item-neighborhood based CF. We adopt 5 different k values (20, 40, 60, 80 , and 100) and investigate the result distribution for different k values. For simplicity, we set the privacy parameter in the shared CF approaches to ε → ∞, i.e., no noise is introduced into the shared data. For each method and each dataset, we record the k value that generates the best performance (the smallest average MAE). Then, for each method and each k value, we calculate the percentage this k can generate in terms of the best performance in all datasets.
The experiments show that for all methods, when k is less than 20, the average performance increases with an increase in k. A k that is too low insufficiently contributes to the CF performance. The t-test indicates that the performance improvement is insignificant when k is less than 3. For most methods, when k = 20, the best performance is attained. Thus, we set k to 20. Note that for the actual deployment, the selection of k could be conducted by an interaction between two parties that would be based on the given setting of ε.
D. THE IMPACT OF THE ADDED NOISE
To achieve (ε, δ)-DP, we can add appropriate Laplace noise to perturb both the similarity scores and data density values. We vary the value of ε from 0.001-1000 to investigate the impact of the added noise to the performance of multiple variants on the shared CF approach. With the calibrated shared data, we conduct experiments on 15 datasets in A to evaluate the 4 variants in the shared CF approach. By using the MAE of the shared CF approach minus that of its counterpart without adding noise, we can determine their performance difference. The results show that their average value is 0.92%. i.e., the added noise decreases the accuracy of shared CF less than 1%. To provide a holistic view of the impact of added noise on the performance of shared CF, we conduct the experiments on the average performance differences for ε values from 0.001-1000. Fig. 3 graphs the results, where the horizontal axis indicates different values of ε, and the vertical axis indicates the average performance difference between the shared CF approach and their non-private counterparts (i.e., no noise is added) over 15 datasets. We can observe that when ε = 1000, the added noise is close to zero, and there is nearly no performance difference between them. The performance difference increases as ε decreases, thus indicating a tradeoff between privacy and accuracy, i.e., as ε decreases (the privacy protection becomes more robust), so does the accuracy of the shared CF approach. When ε = 0.001, the added noise increases the performance difference 15%. When ε → 0, the generated shared data from B should be identical to that of the random guess of the k similar items and data density. The resulting shared data should be pure noise, and the shared CF approaches should underperform the CF approach using A's data only. The statistics show that the difference is significant when ε is less than 0.5 (verified via a two-tailed t-test with p-value=0.01), thus implying that when ε ≥ 0.5, the accuracy decrease caused by the added noise is not remarkable.
E. COMPARISON WITH NON-PRIVATE CF APPROACHES
We also employ the traditional single-party CF approach as a baseline to evaluate the shared CF. The latter aims to improve the prediction accuracy using MAE and shared data from B. Thus, the first series of baseline experiments employ item neighborhood based CF with A's data only, i.e., the prediction is based on (4.4) . Item similarity analysis is conducted with PC and LSM based methods. Similarly, we conduct experiments with the single-party data using the learningbased method, i.e., (4.7), though with w B ij = 0 for each item pair. Shared data from B is generated while preserving privacy using our proposed method. Without privacy concerns, B could share all its detailed rating data with A. Then, another series of baseline experiments generate predictions for A, but with the existing original rating scores of both M A and M B . This scenario can be considered identical as the scenario in which A includes a user set U A ∪ U B , and the rating matrix is the concatenation matrix of M A and M B . This baseline is used to determine the influence on CF of incorporating privacy considerations.
Eight non-private CF methods are used as baselines:
• P(A): single party CF with A's data using PC based similarity;
• L(A): single party CF with A's data using LSM based similarity;
• P(A+B): shared CF with both A's and B's original rating data using PC based similarity;
• L(A+B): shared CF with both A's and B's original data using LSM based similarity;
• P(A)-learning, L(A)-learning, P(A+B)-learning, L(A+B)-learning are learning-based versions of the above four methods. For each group #i (i = 1-15) of A's datasets, five experiments are conducted for P(A), L(A), P(A)-learning and L(A)-learning, each of which is completed with one of group #i's 5 sets. For the remaining four methods incorporating B's data, MAE is calculated similarly to the shared CF approach. Using the curve in Fig. 3 as a reference, we illustrate the comparative results with ε = 0.1 for the shared CF approaches in Fig. 4 , where the horizontal axis represents the density ratio of A's training data to that of B's, and the vertical axis represents the resulting average MAE value. Fig. 4 shows that all shared CF methods outperform the single-party CF and even outperform P(A+B) and L(A+B), which use B's original data. Among the four shared CF methods, two learning-based versions result in approximately equal performances. When the density ratio is less than 35%, these versions perform best. The performances of the two intuitive CF approaches are also close to each other. They outperform the learning-based versions when the density ratio is greater than 35%. 
FIGURE 5. Performance increase ratio to L(A).
Within the two memory-based baselines, L(A) yields better performance than P(A) when the density ratio is greater than 10%. To show the positive effects of the shared CF methods more clearly, another chart is provided in Fig. 5 , where we select L(A)'s average MAE as the baseline, and the performance increase ratio of other methods to L(A) is calculated. The chart indicates that the sparser A's data are, the greater the performance increase is from adopting our shared CF methods. When the density ratio is less than 10, two learning-based shared CF approaches with L(A) and P(A) increases the performance approximately 10% and 6% more than baselines. Other intuitive shared CF methods could also yield an approximately 6% performance increase ratio to L(A). The statistical analysis shows that the performance improvement is significant according to a two-tailed t-test with p = 0.01. When A's data are too sparse to provide sufficient information for CF, B's data can help significantly. The statistical analysis also shows that compared with the non-private CF approach L(A), the learning-based shared CF approach generates a performance improvement that is remarkable for ε = 0.01 and not remarkable for ε = 0.001. From Figures 3 and 4 , when ε is less than 0.005, we conclude that the contribution of the shared data is counteracted by the introduced noise. As ε decreases, the learning-based shared CF approach underperforms L(A) and P(A) gradually.
Figs. 4 and 5 show that although P(A+B) and L(A+B) leverage B's data, even with the detailed original rating of B, their performance is worse compared with the methods using only A's data. That is, if we leverage B's data while only concatenating M A and M B , the performance of CF for A is not guaranteed to improve and might worsen. The reason for this result is analyzed below. Because the two parties have different user groups, the community feature differs from each other. If the rating data are combined for item similarity analysis, each party's data may constitute noise for the other party, thereby degrading the performance. However, the proposed methods do not directly use the detailed ratings of B, yet they leverage the item neighborhood information generated by B. This finding is consistent with [10] , i.e., the user-to-user similarity is unreliable when items from various domains are combined.
Compared with memory approaches, all versions of learning-based approaches exhibit relatively stable performance with respect to different data sparsities. However, when the data are dense, learning-based approaches underperform memory approaches. When data are sparse, learningbased methods are more advantageous. The reason for these results might be that when there are more training data, the model is more likely to overfit the data. Compared with memory-based methods, learning-based methods offer the following advantages: (1) the data density is not required; (2) the performance is not sensitive to similarity measures because the results of four learning-based methods are similar. Thus, when A's data are sparse, learning-based methods are recommended.
Additionally, Fig. 4 shows that P(A) is the only method whose performance curve does not increase with an increased density ratio. We conjecture that two factors cause this result: (1) P(A) uses only the data from A, and the sampling training data does not reflect the underlying distribution of the entire (or validation) dataset; and (2) P(A) is a memorybased approach, which is more sensitive to deviations than the learning-based approach.
For the shared CF approach, when A's data are considerably sparser than B's data, though the contribution ratio of A's neighborhood information is small according to (4.5) , it is nonetheless effective. To prove this result, we conduct experiments in which the neighborhood information used for prediction is obtained only from B's output, where P(B) is implemented, i.e., PC based similarity is used. The results in Fig. 6 illustrate that when A's data are significantly sparser than B's data are (the density ratio is less than 15%), our shared CF method performs better than with when it uses either A's or B's dataset. Fig. 6 also shows that when the density ratio is greater than approximately 15%, the performance of L(A)+Pε(B) is nearly identical to that of P(B). Because MovieLens and Netflix are both movie datasets with general user communities, though their different user groups generate different user interest patterns, such differences may be trivial. Thus, when the density of these two datasets is similar, the neighborhood generated by either party is similar, and the effect of neighborhood boosting is negligible. In the future, we plan to seek other datasets with different user interest patterns, e.g., the users represent distinct cultural environments. Then, further experiments could be conducted to collect data concerning neighborhood boosting.
Figs. 4, 5 and 6 show that when A's data density is greater than 0.13%, L(A) outperforms P(A). When A's data becomes sparser, however, L(A)'s performance decreases, while P(A)'s performance increases, even outperforming L(A). This result demonstrates that LSM based similarity offers an absolute advantage over the PC based approach.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a shared collaborative filtering methodology to leverage data from contributor parties to improve the collaborative filtering performance of the beneficiary party. The framework of local sensitivity-based differential privacy is adopted to facilitate per-user privacy enforcement. To leverage the shared data, two algorithms are devised to merge the item neighborhood information of the contributor and beneficiary. The experiments show that with the privacy guarantee, our shared collaborative filtering improves the recommendation accuracy and can outperform methods that incorporate detailed original ratings of the contributor but do not consider privacy issues.
Future work is to investigate how to use the shared data from multiple contributors and how frequently to update the shared data, which are important in enabling the practical application of shared collaborative filtering in e-business systems [50] , [51] . 
